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13 TRAVIS KALANICK

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
16 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17 WAYMO LLC,  
18 Plaintiffs,  
19 v.  
20 UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;  
21 OTTOMOTTO, LLC; OTTO TRUCKING  
22 LLC,  
23 Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-00939-WHA

**DECLARATION OF ALLAN T. VOGEL  
IN SUPPORT OF MR. KALANICK'S  
OPPOSITION TO WAYMO'S MOTION  
TO COMPEL MR. KALANICK'S CELL  
PHONE/CELL PHONE IMAGE**

1 I, Allan T. Vogel, hereby declare:

2 1. I am employed as a Senior Cybersecurity Analyst with Fidelis Cybersecurity, a global  
3 electronic discovery, computer forensics and litigation support consulting firm headquartered in  
4 Bethesda, Maryland. I received my Bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice/Digital Forensics from  
5 Dixie State University, and am currently in the process of obtaining my Master's degree in  
6 Cybersecurity/Digital Forensics. I have been conducting forensic analysis and providing electronic  
7 litigation consulting services, specifically for mobile data, for more than eight years. Among other  
8 devices and operating systems, I have specific experience conducting forensic analysis on Apple  
9 iPhone mobile devices, including 11 generations of iPhone devices running iOS operating systems  
10 ranging from iOS 3.2 to 10.3.2. I have earned several industry certifications, including in Digital  
11 Forensics, Network Security, Incident Response, Cyber Ethics, Cyber Law and White Collar  
12 Crime. My curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit A. I have personal knowledge of the following  
13 facts, and if called to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto.

14 2. On June 28, 2017, I was retained by Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP ("Orrick"), to  
15 perform forensic analysis and consultation in connection with a forensic image created by Stroz  
16 Friedberg ("Stroz") of a 256 gigabyte Apple iPhone 7 running iOS 10.3.2 belonging to Travis  
17 Kalanick. The scope of my engagement included reviewing and assessing the quality of the  
18 imaging and recovering all existing and recoverable deleted text messages from the image of Mr.  
19 Kalanick's mobile device.

20 3. On June 29, 2017, I shadowed a forensic examiner from Stroz as he created an advanced  
21 logical image of Mr. Kalanick's iPhone 7. An advanced logical image ("image") captures all of  
22 the unique user data that exists on a device. Creating an image involves extracting the file system  
23 structure for the data on the device, all call logs, SMSs, MMSs, application data, data files, notes,  
24 and files located in unallocated space on the device. As part of the extraction process, the imaging  
25 system decodes to reveal deleted files.

26 4. Based upon my review and analysis of Stroz's imaging process and the resulting image  
27 of Mr. Kalanick's mobile device, it is my opinion that the creation of the image was completed in  
28 accordance with the standards and practices of the Digital Forensics Industry. Stroz implemented

1 the correct methodology by adhering to strict protocols to create a forensically sound image,  
2 thereby ensuring that the evidence would not be contaminated, and each step of the process was  
3 documented in the appropriate manner to allow other experts to recreate the original process.

4 5. Using a forensic application called Cellebrite, version 6.2.5.39, which is a well-  
5 recognized forensic tool commonly used in the industry that allows for the extraction and detailed  
6 analysis of information, I identified all existing and recoverable deleted text messages and text  
7 message fragments found on the image of Mr. Kalanick's iPhone. As part of my work, I used a  
8 built-in feature of the Cellebrite tool to export the text message data to a Microsoft Excel  
9 spreadsheet and provided that spreadsheet to Orrick.

10 6. A significant portion of the messages I was able to recover on the image of Mr. Kalanick's  
11 iPhone were contained in what are referred to in the industry as "carved strings." File carving is a  
12 process used by forensics examiners to recover data from an electronic storage device, including,  
13 for example, to recover files that are corrupted, damaged, deleted or missing metadata. The location  
14 of text messages in carved strings of data indicates that, at the time of imaging, the text messages  
15 no longer resided with metadata intact in the messaging databases, for example because the text  
16 messages have been deleted and are no longer visible in the iPhone text message application.

17 7. When a text message is deleted from an Apple iPhone 7 device, the text message is no  
18 longer accessible using the iPhone's standard user interface, but the data continues to reside on the  
19 iPhone's flash storage in the messaging databases and can be retrieved using forensic tools.  
20 However, because the amount of available flash storage space on the iPhone is finite, data from  
21 deleted text messages only remains in the flash storage until the system determines that the space  
22 taken up by the old data is needed for new data, at which point the old data is overwritten by new  
23 data. One way to think about it is that when a message is deleted, it then remains in the message  
24 database with a tag "ready to be permanently overwritten." Once more data comes along that needs  
25 to be stored on the phone, that data will fill the spot of the item tagged "ready to be permanently  
26 overwritten." Once that happens, the "ready to be permanently overwritten" message, or a portion  
27 of it, is no longer recoverable from the iPhone's flash storage.

28 8. Only the iPhone's operating system, not the person performing the deletion, determines

1 and controls where new data will overwrite deleted text message data, and the new data does not  
2 necessarily take over the spot of the oldest “ready to be permanently overwritten” message first –  
3 the operating system could permanently delete a message that had been deleted long ago, or one  
4 that was newly deleted, depending on system needs. When the overwriting process starts, it does  
5 not overwrite files one by one, nor does it necessarily overwrite complete files. Partial files may  
6 remain on the hard drive until the whole file is eventually written over, leaving artifacts and/or  
7 fragments of documents or files. As part of my analysis, I was able to identify and recover 66,044  
8 lines of carved strings from the sql databases on Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone (the databases where text  
9 messages are stored). Based on my observations, the volume of carved strings appearing on the  
10 image of Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone 7 is consistent with the use of an auto-delete function and the high  
11 volume of data usage reflected on the device.

12 9. My review of the configuration files contained on the image of Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone  
13 confirmed that prior to June 2017, Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone was set to auto-delete text messages once  
14 they became 30 days old. Configuration files are files that reflect, among other information, user-  
15 selected configuration parameters, including auto-deletion settings. When a user changes a  
16 configuration parameter, that change is recorded in a configuration file that includes a time stamp  
17 reflecting the time of the configuration change. Configuration files for Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone  
18 indicate that his iPhone was configured to automatically delete text messages after thirty days at all  
19 times relevant. My analysis of the configuration files on Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone is consistent with  
20 the data deletion patterns reflected on the device, the time and date stamps associated with deleted  
21 messages, and the fact that I was able to carve a large amount of text messages from Mr. Kalanick’s  
22 iPhone. In previous examinations of iPhones that have the 30-day auto-delete function turned on,  
23 I have observed similar patterns and behaviors to those exhibited by Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone.

24 10. The 30-day auto-delete function is a standard option available on all iPhones, which any  
25 iPhone user can select and utilize. The feature deletes all text messages that become 30 days old,  
26 not just specific messages or messages to/from specific contacts. In my experience, auto-delete is  
27 a feature commonly used by individuals with high text volumes, as it is a useful tool to manage  
28 storage space on a phone. In my opinion, there is nothing unique about how Mr. Kalanick’s phone

1 stored and processed deleted messages and the associated data.

2 11. During my examination, I discovered that the metadata contained on Mr. Kalanick's  
3 phone at the time of the imaging identified who messages were "from," but, in the majority of  
4 instances, did not identify who text messages were sent "to." In other words, in most instances,  
5 there was no metadata reflecting who a text message was sent "to." In order to try to understand  
6 why this was the case, I consulted Cellebrite's internal knowledge base, a resource that is accessible  
7 to those who obtain a license to use Cellebrite. Cellebrite's internal knowledge base provides  
8 information about known issues related to the Cellebrite tool. The Cellebrite internal knowledge  
9 base did not list any information related to why the "to" information was not identifiable.

10 12. In a further effort to identify why the "to" information was missing, I extracted the entirety  
11 of the databases present on the image of Mr. Kalanick's phone and attempted to analyze them as  
12 standalone artifacts. I was unable to access the "to" information in the databases due to the iPhone  
13 7's built-in encryption technology. As part of my efforts, I also contacted colleagues in the mobile  
14 forensics industry, including the Assistant Director of the Southwest Regional Computer Crime  
15 Institute, to inquire about the issue, and she had not encountered this specific problem before.

16 13. [REDACTED]  
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
1        14. After my interview with Discovia, I contacted a representative from the Cellebrite  
2 Technical Support Team to inquire about the issue of the missing “to” fields. The representative  
3 told me he had not previously heard of this type of issue, and assigned a Case ID number to my  
4 inquiry. On Wednesday, August 9, a Cellebrite representative contacted me. The representative  
5 could not provide a definitive answer as to whether Cellebrite’s software was the cause of the  
6 missing “to” field data, did not have specific ideas as to why this issue was occurring, did not state  
7 that this is a known issue with Cellebrite’s software, and could not propose a ready fix for the issue.

8        15. When Stroz took the image of Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone on June 29, 2017, the “iCloud”  
9 backup setting on Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone was set to “false.” This confirms that at the time that Mr.  
10 Kalanick’s iPhone was imaged on June 29, 2017, the device was not configured to backup back up  
11 any data to iCloud, which is consistent with other forensic artifacts I reviewed from Mr. Kalanick’s  
12 iPhone which showed no signs of iCloud backup.

13        16. According to device metadata, Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone, imaged on June 29, 2017, was first  
14 used on February 10, 2017. On that date, data was transferred via a compressed file from Mr.  
15 Kalanick’s prior device or devices to the iPhone that was imaged on June 29, 2017.

16        17. It is my opinion, based on my experience and work, that I have identified all existing text  
17 messages and all recoverable deleted text messages present on the image of Mr. Kalanick’s iPhone.  
18  
19

20        I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is  
21 true and correct. Executed on this 10<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2017 at Las Vegas, Nevada.

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23   
24 Allan T. Vogel